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I. INTRODUCTION 
Forty years ago, Congress passed many of the nation’s federal 
environmental laws.  Congress and state legislatures recognized the 
growing environmental damage occurring in the country and passed 
laws restricting the actions of businesses, individuals, and government 
entities.  One of the hallmarks of these environmental laws is the growth 
of permitting programs.  Acknowledging that a halt to all pollution and 
development was both impractical and undesirable, governments 
developed programs to minimize, monitor, and mitigate environmental 
harms.  Over the past forty years, private organizations have been 
increasingly involved in these permitting programs.  For example, 
 
* Associate Professor, SUNY–Buffalo Law School.  Thanks to Kalyani Robbins for organizing 
Akron’s symposium on the Next Generation of Environmental & Natural Resources Law.  The 
lively discussions and questions improved this piece and my thinking about the future of 
environmental law generally.  Suggestions from Eric Biber, Fred Cheever, and Robin Craig were 
particularly helpful for this Article and future planned work.  As is often the case, Adena R. 
Rissman provided helpful suggestions and caught embarrassing errors.  I am in her debt. 
1
Owley: The Increasing Privatization
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2013
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 9 OWLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  3:20 PM 
1092 AKRON LAW REVIEW [46:1091 
through conservation easements and mitigation banks, private businesses 
and nonprofit organizations have taken on the responsibilities of 
monitoring and enforcing environmental permits. 
This article examines the increasing privatization of environmental 
law by taking a close look at mitigation measures in permitting 
programs.  As mitigation has become an increasingly important element 
of permitting programs, permitting agencies have looked for outside 
organizations to help design, monitor, and enforce the mitigation 
projects.  Thus, compensatory mitigation projects provide a good lens 
for examining the role of private organizations in environmental law.  
There are good reasons for drawing on the power of private 
organizations.  They can provide flexibility and expertise as well as 
increased capacity.  However, concerns regarding democracy and 
accountability arise when government agencies hand off duties to private 
actors.  It is not clear that the private organizations have adequate 
oversight, and there are no clear mechanisms for stepping in when these 
organizations fail to perform (or inadequately perform) their 
conservation duties.  This increasing privatization has largely occurred 
without a public debate regarding who is the appropriate entity to carry 
out and enforce environmental law.  The privatization has gone 
unnoticed and under examined.  Environmental conservation is a public 
duty, and we should be concerned with the increasing privatization of 
that task. 
II. THE RISE OF COMPENSATORY MITIGATION 
A. Background 
Mitigation is a key element of most environmental and land-use 
permitting programs.1  Many environmental laws appear to prohibit 
environmental degradation outright, but then contain provisions allowing 
for environmentally destructive activities after obtaining appropriate 
permits.2  Permit programs generally require that permit applicants 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Margaret S. Race & Mark S. Fonseca, Fixing Compensatory Mitigation: What 
Will It Take?, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 94 (1996) (describing the rise of compensatory 
mitigation in the wetlands context); Robert Bonnie, Endangered Species Mitigation Banking: 
Promoting Recovery Through Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act, 
240 THE SCI. OF THE TOTAL ENV’T 11 (1999) (describing mitigation for loss of endangered species 
habitat); Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and 
Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultrual Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113 (1998) (discussing 
mitigation for loss of agricultural land).  
 2.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
7401-7671 (2010); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (originally enacted in 
2
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avoid, minimize, and mitigate environmental harms arising from their 
proposed project.3 
This section offers two example mitigation programs to illustrate 
how mitigation programs arose and to outline their general structure.  
The following section demonstrates the increasing privatization of 
mitigation programs and the concerns associated with that privatization.  
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, permittees receive 
permission to alter wetlands in exchange for promises to mitigate harm 
from that wetland alteration.4  Similarly, Section 10 of the Endangered 
Species Act creates a permit program for incidental takes of endangered 
species.5  Under Section 10, developers can avoid criminal charges for 
violations of the take prohibition (i.e., harming individuals of a species 
or altering species’ critical habitat) by creating a Habitat Conservation 
Plan and receiving a Section 10 incidental take permit.6  The Habitat 
Conservation Plan must outline plans to mitigate any negative impacts 
on species.7  These two major environmental laws place mitigation 
projects at the center of their environmental protection schemes. 
B. Examples 
1. The Clean Water Act’s Section 404 Permitting Program 
The objective of the Clean Water Act is to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters.8  In 
an effort to achieve that objective, the Clean Water Act limits the ability 
to discharge pollutants into waters of the United States.9  Through 
Section 404, the statute seeks to prevent discharge of dredged or fill 
materials into wetlands within the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction.10  To 
legally dredge or fill a wetland that comes under federal jurisdiction, one 
 
1973); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Regulations, 40 C.F.R §§ 239-282 (2013).  
 3.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2013) (defining mitigation for operations under the 
National Environmental Policy Act); Morgan Robertson & Palmer Hough, Wetlands Regulation: 
The Case of Mitigation Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, in WETLANDS 171 (B.A. LePage 
ed. 2011); Stephen M. Johnson, Avoid, Minimize, Mitigate: The Continuing Constitutionality of 
Wetlands Mitigation After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 689 (1995). 
 4.  33 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 5.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a). 
 6.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 
 7.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) & (v). 
 8.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). 
 9.  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1). 
 10.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(2). 
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must first obtain a Section 404 permit.11  These permits (issued by the 
Army Corps of Engineers with coordination and oversight from the 
Environmental Protection Agency) require project proponents to avoid, 
minimize, and mitigate the harms of any wetland destruction or 
modification.12  The Army Corps rarely denies these permits and while 
the EPA has the authority under Section 404(c) to veto permits that it 
feels are not adequately protective of the environment, it rarely does 
so.13 
When granting Section 404 permits, the Corps requires project 
proponents to mitigate any damage occurring to wetlands caused by the 
project.  Indeed, with a national policy of no net loss of wetlands, 
mitigation is imperative.14  Mitigation comes in three categories: 
avoidance, minimization, and compensation.15  First, permit applicants 
(usually developers) must avoid any harm to wetlands.16  Next, they 
 
 11.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).  As the Supreme Court has instructed, not all wetlands fall under the 
Clean Water Act’s scope.  The debate over jurisdictional wetlands has been prevalent in the courts 
and academic literature, and I will not enter the fray here.  For more details and discussion, see 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (detailing the history of the Court’s jurisprudence 
regarding the term “waters of the United States”); U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, REVISED 
GUIDANCE ON CLEAN WATER ACT JURISDICTION FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN 
RAPANOS V. U.S. AND CARABELL V. U.S. (2008), available at 
http://www.usace.army.mil/Portals/2/docs/civilworks/regulatory/cwa_guide/cwa_juris_2dec08.pdf; 
Margaret “Peggy” Strand & Lowell M. Rothschild, What Wetlands Are Regulated? Jurisdiction of 
the §404 Program, 40 ENVTL. L. RPTR. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10372 (2010) (providing detailed 
information about Section 404 cases); Mark Squillace, From “Navigable Waters” to 
“Constitutional Waters”: The Future of Federal Wetlands Regulations, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
799 (2007); Jonathan H. Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting “Waters of the United States” 
and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Patrick 
Parenteau, Bad Calls: How Corps’ Districts are Making Up Their Own Rules of Jurisdiction Under 
the Clean Water Act, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2004-2005); Kim Diana Connolly, Keeping Wetlands 
Wet: Are Existing Protections Enough?, 6 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 169 (2004-2005). 
 12.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); Connolly, supra note 11 at 174-175; Palmer Hough & Morgan 
Robertson, Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act” Where it Comes From, What it 
Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT. 15, 16 (2009). 
 13.  33 U.S.C. § 1344(c); Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 850 F.Supp.2d 
133, 139-43 (D.D.C. 2012). Clean Water Act Section 404(C) “Veto Authority,” ENVTL PROT. 
AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/dredgdis/404c_index.cfm (last visited Oct. 
19, 2012); see also Squillace, supra note 11, at n.11; Jessica Owley, Privatizing Wetlands 
Mitigation, in BEYOND JURISDICTION: WETLANDS POLICY FOR THE NEXT GENERATION (Kim 
Connolly ed. forthcoming 2014); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 27 (explaining the rarity of 
permit denials).  
 14.  Wetlands, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/water/wetlands/ (last visited Dec. 14, 2012) 
(explaining President George H.W. Bush’s 1989 adoption of the “no net loss” policy). 
 15.  Johnson, supra note 3, at 695. 
 16.  Id.  
4
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must design their project to minimize any harm.17  Finally, the 
developers must compensate for any harm still expected to occur after 
avoidance and minimization.18  The third category of mitigation, 
compensatory mitigation, is a troubling concept because it acknowledges 
wetland destruction will occur.19  Instead of preventing wetland 
conversion, developers compensate for the wetlands lost.20  Most efforts 
of wetland protection appear focused on compensation, often neglecting 
the avoidance and minimization requirements.21 
Corps regulations set forth four acceptable compensatory mitigation 
strategies: restoration, establishment, enhancement, and preservation.22  
These are relatively straightforward sounding approaches but can be 
challenging to implement.23  Establishment (or creation) requires 
building a wetland out of whole cloth where one did not exist before.24  
Wetland creation has been beset by a variety of problems with many 
failed projects.25  Restoration takes an existing but degraded wetland and 
increases its function by doing things like removing debris and invasive 
species, planting wetlands species, and ensuring adequate water 
supplies.26  This is linked to enhancement, which also starts with an 
existing wetland and increases its functions.27  The difference between 
restoration and enhancement is that they come from different starting 
points.  Enhanced wetlands tend to be healthy functioning ecosystems 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Wetland Regulatory Authority, THE WETLAND FACT SHEET SERIES (EPA, Washington, 
DC), available at http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/reg_authority.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 14, 2012); Clean Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 230.91(c)(2) (West 
2013). 
 19.  WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES GOSSELINK, WETLANDS 379-80 (4th ed. 2007). 
 20.  Todd BenDor, Nicholas Brozovic, & Varkki George Pallathucerhril, The Social Impacts 
of Wetland Mitigation Policies in the United States, 22 J. PLANNING LITERATURE 341, 342 (2008). 
 21.  See Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 29. 
 22.  40 C.F.R. § 230.92. 
 23.  See MITSCH & GOSSELINK, supra note 19, at 381-424. 
 24.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, E.P.A, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/pdf/CMitigation.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2012).  
 25.  See William J. Mitsch & Renee F. Wilson, Improving the Success of Wetland Creation 
and Restoration with the Know-How, Time, and Self-Design, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 77 
(1996); Dennis F. Whigham, Ecological Issues Related to Wetland Preservation, Restoration, 
Creation ad Assessment, 240 SCI. TOTAL ENVT. 31 (1999); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 
24. 
 26.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24; WILLIAM J. MITSCH & JAMES G. 
GOSSELINK, supra note 19, at 377-424 (explaining different restoration techniques and strategies). 
 27.  R.R. Lewis, Wetlands Restoration/Creation/Enhancement Terminology: Suggestions for 
Standardization, in WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 417-22 
(Jon A. Kusler & Mary E. Kentula eds., 1990) (describing the different wetlands terms and offering 
a glossary). 
5
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with capacity for even higher quality environmental protection than they 
are currently providing while restoration projects usually start with 
rather degraded parcels.  Restoration and enhancement projects have 
largely fared better than creation projects, and understandings of 
restoration ecology are improving the outcomes for all of these 
projects.28  Yet, restoration projects provide fewer acres and fewer 
functions than ecologists had predicted.29  After creating, restoring, or 
enhancing wetlands, the wetlands themselves are usually protected with 
conservation easements with the hopes of keeping the wetlands from 
being degraded or converted again in the future.30 
The final option for compensatory mitigation is preservation.31  
Preservation involves protecting existing wetlands in exchange for 
destroying wetlands.32  Preservation of wetlands can occur either by 
securing fee simple ownership of wetlands and then ensuring that the 
wetlands will be protected from development and conversion or by 
securing conservation easements over wetlands.33  The Corps works 
with the applicant to determine the correct ratio of destroyed versus 
protected wetlands.34  The option to use preservation as a mitigation 
option is particularly unsatisfying because, as even the EPA 
acknowledges, it results in a net loss of wetlands.35  Preservation on its 
own does not increase wetland function or acreage.  It accepts a decrease 
in both as worth the benefit that will be supplied by the development 
project. 
The Clean Water Act did not originally involve mitigation in its 
permitting program.36  Initially, it was thought that if proposed projects 
were likely to lead to ecosystem disruption, the permits associated with 
 
 28.  See Anya Hopple & Christopher Craft, Managed Disturbance Enhances Biodiversity of 
Restored Wetlands in the Agricultural Midwest, ECOLOGICAL ENG’G (In press 29 March 2012); Joy 
B. Zedler & Suzanne Kercher, Wetland Resources: Status, Trends, Ecosystem Services, 
Degradation, and Restorability, 30 ANN. REV. ENVT. & RESOURCES 39, 60 (2005). 
 29.  See David Malakoff, Restored Wetlands Flunk Real-World Test, 280 SCI. 371 (1999) 
(noting struggles but suggesting that given enough time the projects might end up more successful 
than currently being demonstrated). 
 30.  Jessica Fox & Anamaria Nino-Murcia, Status of Species Conservation Banking in the 
United States, 19 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 996, 997 (2005). 
 31.  40 C.F.R. § 230.92 (West 2013). 
 32.  See Robert E. Beck, The Movement in the United States to Restoration and Creation of 
Wetlands, 34 NAT. RES. J. 781, 798 (1994). 
 33.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24. 
 34.  James T. Robb, Assessing Wetland Compensatory Mitigation Sites to Aid in Establishing 
Mitigation Ratios, 22 WETLANDS 435, 439 (2002).  
 35.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24. 
 36.  The EPA and the Corps added mitigation requirements to their Section 404(b)(1), 
Guidelines in 1990, codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 230. 
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/10
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 9 OWLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  3:20 PM 
2013] THE INCREASING PRIVATIZATION 1097 
those projects would be denied.37  However, Congress quickly 
acknowledged that it would be politically undesirable to deny many 
permits (particularly for popular projects).38  Thus, there was a perceived 
need to issue permits to facilitate such projects alongside a desire to 
lessen potential harm from those projects.39  Without a flexible permit 
program, the extensive network of wetlands in this country might 
prevent desired development.  Congress acknowledged that it was not in 
the public interest to stop all development for the sake of improving 
water quality.40  Some water pollution can be an acceptable exchange for 
the benefits gained from development projects like homes, roads, and 
hospitals.  Thus, instead of prohibiting development, the Clean Water 
Act seeks to minimize development’s impacts on wetlands.  Issuing a 
permit with conditions embodies an assessment that the remaining 
unavoidable impacts are acceptable.  That is, the Corps (and the EPA) 
believes that the benefits of the development project outweigh the harm 
to the wetlands. 
Programs for compensatory mitigation wetlands take three forms: 
(1) permittee-driven, (2) mitigation banks, or (3) in lieu programs.41  
Permittee-driven mitigation, which is the largest category of projects, 
involves the permit applicant establishing her own mitigation program.42  
She arranges the mitigation projects, usually with the help of outside 
consultants and government agencies.  The permittee arranges for the 
conservation easements involved, often through negotiation with a land 
trust.43  Such conservation easements may burden land owned by the 
 
 37.  Richard F. Ambrose, Wetlands Mitigation in the United States: Assessing the Success of 
Mitigation Policies, 19 WETLANDS (AUSTRALIA) 1, 2-5 (2000) (detailing the development of 
wetlands mitigation policies); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 17. 
 38.  See Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 17 (arguing that the allowing general permits 
“was an acknowledgement that Congress intended the 404 program to allow large numbers of 
permitted impacts which damaged wetlands”). 
 39.  Robertson & Hough, supra note 3, at 174. 
 40.  The mere existence of numerous permit programs demonstrates this. 
 41.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24. 
 42.  Id.; Adrienne M. Sakyi, Mitigation Banking: Is State Assumption of Permitting Authority 
More Effective?, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1027, 1032 (2010); Hough & 
Robertson, supra note 12, at 24.  The ease of structuring one’s own mitigation program, lack of 
availability of mitigation credits, and preferences for on-site and in-kind mitigation may explain 
why most mitigation projects are permittee-driven. 
 43.  Under state law, conservation easements can usually be held by governmental entities 
and land trusts, with some varying constraints on the type of agency that can hold the conservation 
easement and requirements of land trust holders.  Under permitting schemes, public agencies may 
hold conservation easements as well.  This article examines the concerns arising when the 
conservation easements are held by land trusts, but when a public agency uses conservation 
easements we also have a unique host of concerns.  While public agency actions are more easily 
reviewed or challenged than the actions of private organizations, traditional agency analysis shifts 
7
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permittee or permittees may purchase conservation easements on others’ 
property.  The role of land trusts and conservation easements is 
discussed in more detail below.44 
When compensatory mitigation occurs through mitigation banks, 
the permittee purchases the appropriate number of credits (as determined 
by the Corps) from a bank (deemed acceptable by the Corps).45  State 
and federal laws govern mitigation banks, which are also subject to 
mitigation bank agreements.46  Such banks may be owned and operated 
by for-profit companies, nonprofit organizations, or state agencies.47  
Where privately owned, the land in the banks is encumbered with 
conservation easements to ensure long-term protection.48 
In-lieu programs involve government agencies (or sometimes 
nonprofit organizations) conducting mitigation projects.49  In such cases, 
permittees pay fees directly to a natural resource agency (or nonprofit) 
that then uses the money to implement wetlands protection projects.50  
The strength of in-lieu programs is that the program manager can pool 
money from multiple permittees to work on larger, more comprehensive 
projects.51  As with the mitigation banking, in-lieu compensatory 
mitigation also occurs off site. 
Many wetland mitigation projects rely on private actors to create, 
maintain, and steward the projects.  This is particularly true for 
preservation projects and wherever conservation easements are used.  
Preservation as mitigation relies heavily on private actors for 
enforcement because government agencies tend to be reluctant to hold 
the conservation easements and monitor the land in perpetuity.  
Increasingly, nonprofit organizations, known as land trusts, oversee the 
preserved wetlands and aquatic resources.52 
 
when the agency operates by contract (as with a conservation easement or mitigation banking 
agreement) instead of using it regulatory authority.  The shift to contract law raises questions about 
reviewability and public participation.  See Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer’s Response to 
Privatization and Outsourcing, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 40 (Michael Taggart 
ed., 1997). 
 44.  See infra section III.B.2. 
 45.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24. 
 46.  See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 
FED. REG. 58, 605 at 58, 613 (Nov. 28, 1995), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/mitbankn.cfm. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Wetlands Compensatory Mitigation, supra note 24. 
 50.  Federal Guidance, supra note 46, at 58,613. 
 51.  Jessica Wilkinson, In-lieu Fee Mitigation: Coming Into Compliance with the New 
Compensatory Mitigation Rule, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY & MGMT 53 (2009). 
 52.  See, e.g., Wetlands Protection: Partnering with Land Trusts, E.P.A, 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/10
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 9 OWLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  3:20 PM 
2013] THE INCREASING PRIVATIZATION 1099 
2. The Endangered Species Act 
The Endangered Species Act has a similar permitting scheme.  In 
1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act.53  The Act 
establishes a program to protect threatened and endangered species and 
the ecosystems upon which they depend.54  Federal protection for a 
species commences once the Department of the Interior lists the species 
in the Federal Register as either threatened or endangered.55  Section 9 
of the Act prohibits any person from “taking” any listed wildlife or fish 
species.56  Under the Act, “take” includes “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.”57  Harm is further defined 
in agency regulations as including “significant habitat modification 
where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing 
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering.”58  With these definitions, the prohibition on taking species 
prevents many actions that involve land conversion or development. 
In 1982, Congress responded to growing protests from developers 
by amending the Endangered Species Act to provide partial relief from 
the Section 9 ban on habitat modification.59  Acknowledging a need to 
balance economic pressures and species preservation, Congress designed 
a framework to foster “creative partnerships” between the public and 
private sectors and state, municipal, and federal agencies.60  The 
amendments added Section 10 to the Act, authorizing the Secretaries of 
Commerce and the Interior to issue incidental take permits.61  These 
permits allow landowners to develop their land even when the land 
provides habitat to listed species, as long as the taking of individual 
members of the species is “incidental to, and not the purpose of, the 
carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity.”62 
To obtain an incidental take permit, applicants must submit a 
 
http://water.epa.gov/type/wetlands/outreach/upload/landtrust-pr.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2013).   
 53.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000) (originally enacted in 1973).  The Senate approved the 
ESA 92-0.  The House then approved a slightly altered version 355-4.  President Nixon signed the 
bill into law on December 28, 1973.  Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 844 (1973). 
 54.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b); Lara M. Bernstein, Ecosystem Communities: Zoning Principles to 
Promote Conservation and the Economy, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1309, 1312 (1995). 
 55.  Bernstein, supra note 54, at 1312. 
 56.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B).  
 57.  Id. § 1532(19). 
 58.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (West 2013). 
 59.  Pub. L. No. 97-304, 86 Stat. 1411 (1982). 
 60.  H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, 97th Congress, 2d Sess. (1982). 
 61.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). 
 62.  Id.  
9
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“comprehensive plan,”63 also known as a Habitat Conservation Plan or 
HCP.  Section 10 explains that an HCP must (1) assess the impact on 
listed species of the proposed activity, (2) analyze alternatives to the 
proposed activity, (3) set out the steps to be taken to minimize and 
mitigate the impact, and (4) describe the funding available to implement 
such steps.64  The regulations define mitigation to include: 
a) Avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or 
parts of an action. 
b) Minimizing impacts by limiting the degree or magnitude of the 
action and its implementation. 
c) Rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or restoring 
the affected environment. 
d) Reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation 
and maintenance operations during the life of the action. 
e) Compensating for the impact by replacing or providing 
substitute resources or environments.65 
This definition follows the contours of Clean Water Act mitigation 
discussed above but with a slightly different approach.  First, unlike the 
Section 404 scheme, there is no stated preference for mitigation types.  
Arguably, avoidance and minimization of harm are pre-mitigation 
strategies.  That is, a project proponent should begin by avoiding all 
possible harm.  Where avoidance is impossible, the applicant should 
minimize the likely harm.  The remaining impacts are the ones the 
applicant should then mitigate (or compensate) for.  The Endangered 
Species Act does not detail the mitigation as clearly as the Clean Water 
Act does.  Thus, (c), (d), and (e) contain elements of compensatory 
mitigation for remaining harms. 
Because these regulations still do not provide detail about what 
HCP mitigation projects should look like and how the HCP process 
should work, the Services provided detail in the jointly issued HCP 
Handbook in 1996.66  This Handbook describes the process of mitigating 
for habitat loss: 
Potential types of habitat mitigation include, but are not limited to: (1) 
acquisition of existing habitat; (2) protection of existing habitat 
 
 63.  Id. § 1539(a)(2)(A). 
 64.  Id.  Additionally, the Secretary may require any other measures he deems necessary or 
appropriate for purposes of the plan. 
 65.  40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (2013). 
 66.  UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE AND NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN HANDBOOK (1996) [hereinafter HCP HANDBOOK]. 
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through conservation easements or other legal instruments; (3) 
enhancement or restoration of disturbed or former habitat; (4) 
prescriptive management of habitat to achieve specific biological 
characteristics; and (5) creation of new habitats.67 
Note that some of these mitigation options do not lead to increased 
habitat; both (1) and (2) are just protecting already-existing habitat.  Yet, 
a cursory investigation into HCP mitigation plans shows that 
preservation of habitat (through fee simple ownership, conservation 
easement, or deed restriction) is the most common mitigation 
technique.68 
As with wetlands mitigation, private organizations are often heavily 
involved in the creation, maintenance, and enforcement of mitigation 
projects.  Privately owned habitat mitigation banks are increasingly 
popular ways to preserve or enhance existing habitat.  Conservation 
easements, often held by land trusts, have also played a fundamental role 
in Endangered Species Act mitigation from the very first HCP in San 
Bruno Mountain in 1986.69 
III. PRIVATIZATION OF MITIGATION 
The preceding section introduced the basics of environmental 
mitigation programs, setting forth the examples of wetland mitigation 
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and habitat mitigation under 
Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act.  The involvement of private 
actors in those schemes is pervasive and follows a general trend of 
privatization with other governmental programs.  This section provides 
some of the broad contours of privatization of governmental services 
with a discussion of programs associated with environmental permitting 
before delving specifically into mitigation programs.  Private actors are 
involved in many areas of governmental decision making and service 
provision.  The role of privatization in mitigation may be less obvious 
than elsewhere.  I explain the extent to which private actors may become 
involved in environmental policy making by overseeing mitigation 
projects—a pattern that appears to be continually on the rise.  After this 
illustration of the phenomenon, the next section discusses some of the 
benefits and drawbacks of turning to private actors to run mitigation 
 
 67.  Id. at 3-21 to 3-22.  
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: The Hard Case of Endangered Species 
Protection, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 293 (2004) [hereinafter Owley, Exacted Conservation 
Easements]. 
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programs and presents questions to ask before allowing the trend to 
continue. 
A. Background 
Privatization of governmental services (also termed “contracting 
out”) has been on the rise.70  This has occurred for a variety of reasons.  
In some cases, cash-strapped governments simply do not have the funds 
or capacity to provide all the services they wish.  Private companies and 
organizations may offer a less expensive alternative.  In other cases, 
privatization appears more efficient because governments do not have 
the relevant expertise or infrastructure.  Many privatization projects arise 
however because of efforts to shrink government and reduce 
bureaucracy.71 
While privatization exists in most public sectors to some degree, 
the most discussed examples occur with prisons, schools, hospitals and 
the military.  Private companies have been running prisons72 and public 
hospitals for many years now.73  Charter schools serve as a privately run 
public option in many school districts.74  Even the U.S. military has been 
hiring private contractors to take on some of its duties.75 
Privatization is popping up in some unexpected areas.  For 
example, Kansas and Nebraska are among the states that have privatized 
their child welfare programs.76  Several states, including California, have 
 
 70.  In this article, I use privatization to mean the increased governmental reliance on the 
private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the needs of society.  See E.S. Savas, 
Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889 (1987).  Jody Freeman argues for a narrower use 
of the term to refer only to turning over government property to private companies, organizations, or 
individuals.  Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative State, 52 
ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 821-22 (2000).  In Freeman’s parlance, what I am focusing on here is the 
contracting out of government services.  Contracting out is but one form of privatization but is the 
main subject of this work. 
 71.  Paul Starr, The Limits of Privatization, 36 PROCEEDINGS ACAD. POLITICAL SCI. 124, 126 
(1987). 
 72.  Savas, supra note 70; Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning 
of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 149 (2010). 
 73.  David U. Himmelstein & Steffie Woolhandler, Privatization in a Publicly Funded Health 
Care System: The U.S. Experience, 38 INT’L J. HEALTH SVCS. 407 (2008). 
 74.  GERALD BRACEY, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PRIVATIZING 
SCHOOLS, COMMERCIALIZING EDUCATION 101-102 (2002).  
 75.  Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of Private Military 
Contractors, 2 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES 101 (2009) (arguing, among other things, that the hiring 
of private military contractors enables the government to mask the true losses of life involved in 
armed conflicts because the military contractors are not included in the body counts). 
 76.  Luke Andrew Steven Demaree, “Tiny Little Shoes”: The Privatization of Child Welfare 
Services in Kansas 69 UMKC L. REV. 643 (2000); Kevin O’Hanlon, Privatization Fails: Nebraska 
Tries Again to Reform Child Welfare, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Aug. 21, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
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privatized fraud prosecution, with private companies pursuing debt 
collection with the imprimatur of attorneys general offices.77  There are 
also increasing pushes to privatize roads,78 sewage systems,79 postal 
delivery,80 and Amtrak.81  Indeed, debates over privatizing Medicare and 
Social Security took center stage in the 2012 presidential contest.82 
There has also been a privatization push in the environmental 
realm.  For example, the National Park Service and other public spaces 
are privatizing operations.83  The land does not become private, but 
private companies take over tasks like collecting fees, cleaning 
bathrooms, and running campsites.  In fact, this is not new for the 
National Park Service, which has had contracts with private companies 
to conduct tours, run lodges, and other operations since Yellowstone first 
opened its gates.84  The U.S. Forest Service has also worked with private 
 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/08/21/10706/privatization-fails-nebraska-tries-again-reform-
child-welfare. 
 77.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Prosecutors, Debt Collectors Find a Partner, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/business/in-prosecutors-debt-
collectors-find-a-partner.html (often threatening jail time for defaulters who refuse to pay). 
 78.  James E. Miller, A Glimpse of What Privitized Roads Could Look Like, AM. THINKER 
(May 20, 2012), 
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/05/a_glimpse_of_what_privatized_roads_could_look_like.ht
ml; Michael Cooper, States Consider Privatizing Roads, N.Y. TIMES. (Apr. 1, 2009).  The 
discussion is lively in right-leaning blogs.  See, e.g., Bart Frazier, Private Roads Work, 
LENROCKWELL.COM (Jan. 2, 2009), http://www.lewrockwell.com/orig6/frazier3.html; Tad 
DeHaven, Privatizing Roads, CATO INST. (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:20 AM), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/privatizing-roads/. 
 79.  Joan Gralla, Update 2-NY Nassau County Budget Delays Sewer Deal, Not Refunds, 
REUTERS, (Sept. 18, 2012, 6:51 pm EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/usa-nassau-
budget-idUSL1E8KIFFC20120918. 
 80.  George F. Will, Privatize the Nation’s Mail Delivery, Opinion, WASH. POST (Nov. 25, 
2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/privatize-the-nations-mail-
delivery/2011/11/23/gIQAe2J7wN_story.html. 
 81.  Keith Laing, GOP Unveils Plan to Privatize Amtrak, THE HILL (June 15, 2011, 12:48 PM 
ET), available at http://thehill.com/blogs/transportation-report/railroads/166601-gop-unveils-plan-
to-privatize-rail-service-provided-by-amtrak. 
 82.  See Laura Meckler, Obama Vows to Fight ‘Privatizations,’ WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2012, 
10:27 PM ET), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443819404577639742331612420.html. 
 83.  George Cameron Coggins & Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the 
National Park System, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 729 (1997). 
 84.  Richard A. Bartlett, The Concessionaires of Yellowstone National Park: Genesis of a 
Policy, 1882-1892, 74 PAC. NW. Q. 2 (1983); MARK DANIEL BARRINGER, SELLING YELLOWSTONE: 
CAPITALISM AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF NATURE (2002); Devin Boyle, Should National Parks be 
Privatized?, BLUE RIDGE OUTDOOR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2012), available at 
http://www.blueridgeoutdoors.com/eco/news-issues/should-national-parks-be-privatized/.  See also 
Dru Stevenson, My Response to the Question: Should National Parks be Privatized, PRIVATIZATION 
BLOG (Sep. 12, 2012), http://www.privatizationblog.com/2012/09/my-response-to-question-should-
national.html; NPS Commercial Services, NAT’L PARK SERV., www.concessions.nps.gov (last 
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concessionaires for decades and allowed private timber and mining 
companies as well as recreation outfitters and ski facilities to operate on 
its lands.85 
Privatization is also occurring in the framework of environmental 
laws and regulations.  We see it both in traditional and neoliberal 
approaches to environmental protection.  For example, the private role is 
evident in market-based schemes like cap and trade programs or land 
conservation through conservation easements.86  Such programs 
establish rules and incentives and hope that market mechanisms will 
result in environmental protection.  Negotiated Rulemaking (or reg-neg) 
also enables private parties (particularly regulated industries) to play a 
significant role in establishing, implementing, and enforcing 
environmental programs.87 
Traditional command-and-control environmental regulations are the 
quintessential example of government-driven policies overseen by a 
complex public bureaucracy, but even these programs involve private 
actors in significant ways.88  We see it in the levels and standards that 
regulated entities must comply with.89  Private organizations are often 
involved in this process, sometimes explicitly by responding to a request 
 
visited Mar. 16, 2013). 
 85.  See Coggins & Glicksman, supra note 83, at 738.  In fact, the U.S. Forest Service is now 
facing litigation from a nonprofit organization known as BARK that argues that the Forest Service’s 
grants to concessionaires violates federal law (the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act) by 
resulting in the Forest Service charging excessive fees for recreational use of lands.  Specifically, 
BARK argues that federal law prevents charging any fees for use of undeveloped land and can only 
charge fees that are justified by the expenses of the facilities provided (e.g., bathrooms, visitor 
centers, parking lots).  Complaint, Bark v. U.S. Forest Service, Civ. No. 12-1506 (D.C. Dist. 
Ct.),available at http://www.cnsenvironmentallaw.com/2012/09/14/Privatize.pdf.  
 86.  See, e.g., Benjamin Cashore, Legitimacy and the Privatization of Environmental 
Governance: How Non-State Market Driven (NSMD) Governance Systems Gain Rule-Making 
Authority, 15 GOVERNANCE 503 (2002); Amy Wilson Morris, Easing Conservation? Conservation 
Easements, Public Accountability and Neoliberalism, 39 GEOFORUM 1215 (2008). 
 87.  Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated 
Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255 (1997); Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual 
Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000). 
 88.  Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-And-Control Efficient? 
Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for 
Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999) (describing common depictions of 
command-and-control instruments); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic 
Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998) (describing intersections between command-and-control pollution 
regulations and economic incentive programs); Edward Balleisen & David Moss, Introduction, in 
GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 4 (Balleisen & Moss eds. 
2009).  
 89.  Jennifer Clapp, The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and 
the Developing World, 4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 295 (1998). 
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to establish standards.90  This occurs throughout environmental 
regulatory processes because agencies are somewhat dependent on the 
regulated industries for information about the pollution their discharge 
and the possible technological ways to address the problem.91  In some 
cases, public agencies adopt already-established voluntary standards.92  
Doing so may be expedient, but it also enables the private firms to set 
their own ground rules.93 
Command and control regulations also rely significantly on private 
participation in implementation.94  There are self-reporting procedures 
for permits and self-identification for coverage.95  Agencies lack the 
resources necessary to do independent research about regulated interests 
and may not have the resources to pursue rule violations.  But 
privatization necessarily entails going beyond mere instances of private 
organizations cooperating with public entities or with each other.96  The 
private actors actually have significant implementation and policy-
making roles. 
Multiple aspects of environmental regulation have been outsourced 
to citizens and private organizations.97  Of particular interest here is the 
use of private organizations for carrying out essential parts of 
environmental permitting programs.  Private actors are involved in 
permits at different levels.  They may determine permit terms, enforce 
permit terms, interpret permit terms, or even alter permits.  For example, 
citizen suit provisions within the Clean Water Act and the Endangered 
Species Act work toward privatizing enforcement of permitting 
 
 90.  Robert Falkner, Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: 
Exploring the Links, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLITICS 72, 79 (2003). 
 91.  Freeman, supra note 70, at 828 (voicing concerns with private standard-setting). 
 92.  See, e.g., Spencer Henson & John Humphrey, The Impacts of Private Food Safety 
Standards on the Food Chain and on Public Standard-Setting Processes, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 
COMMISSION 32ND SESSION 24-25 (2009), available at http://origin-
www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/Codex_al32_09Dbe.pdf (describing government adoption of food safety 
policies); Falkner, supra note 90, at 76. 
 93.  Freeman, supra note 70, at 829. 
 94.  See id. at 835-36 (referring to the command-and-control as a “co-regulatory” regime 
because of the extensive involvement of private actors). 
 95.  See, e.g., John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez, Efficient Enforcement of a Transferable 
Emissions Permit System with a Self-Reporting Requirement, 18 J. REGULATORY ECON. 113 (2000); 
Sarah L. Stafford, Should You Turn Yourself In? The Consequences of Environmental Self-Policing, 
26 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 305 (2007) 
 96.  Falkner, supra note 90, at 73. 
 97.  See, e,g., Miriam Seifter, Rent-A-Regulator: Design and Innovation in Privatized 
Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091 (2006) (describing the hiring of private 
environmental compliance officers). 
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programs under those laws.98  This can also be a form of privatization 
for monitoring and compliance efforts.  While citizen-suit provisions 
seek to work in tandem with (as opposed to at odds with) public 
enforcement, they bring private actors into the framework of the law.99  
Where public agencies are lacking capacity for enforcement, these 
private attorneys general provisions may play pivotal roles in forwarding 
the goals of environmental protection.100  The Endangered Species Act 
goes even further to privatize endangered species protection.  Not only 
does the statute have a citizen suit provision for enforcing its permit 
program, but it also involves citizens in the decision of which species to 
protect.101 
As explained above, many environmental laws involve the use of 
permitting programs to limit environmentally destructive activities.  In 
carrying out these programs, government agencies have turned to private 
organizations for assistance.  The mitigation procedures for both 
wetlands and endangered species protection outlined above rely heavily 
on private actors for their success. 
B. Examples 
Private actors pop up in mitigation programs in a few places.  
Permit applicants hire firms to help with environmental review of 
mitigation programs or to help design mitigation projects.102  They hire 
ecological restorationists and conservation biologists to enhance and 
create wetlands and other desired ecological features.103  This is not 
surprising or worrisome.  We anticipate that permit applicants will not 
have the expertise needed to perform these activities and yet we place 
responsibility for their completion on the applicants.  Such actions and 
plans are still subject to public review and government agencies confirm 
that the proposals will make ecological sense and yield desired 
 
 98.  33 U.S.C. 1365 (West 2013); 16 USC § 1540(g) (West 2013). 
 99.  James R, May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits at 30, 10 
WIDENER L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 100.  Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary 
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985). 
 101.  See Berry J. Brosi & Eric G.N. Biber, Citizen Involvement in the U.S. Endangered 
Species Act, 337 SCI. 802 (2012) (explaining that citizen petitions are more likely to cover 
biologically threatened species than those species selected by the government agency). 
 102.  See, e.g., ECOSYSTEM RENEWAL, 
http://www.ecosystemrenewal.com/company/index.shtml (providing services designing 
compensatory mitigation projects). 
 103.  See, e.g., CARDNO JFNEW, http://www.cardnojfnew.com/ (wetlands restoration 
consultants). 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/10
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 9 OWLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  3:20 PM 
2013] THE INCREASING PRIVATIZATION 1107 
mitigation outcomes. 
There are a few places where the role of the private actors goes 
beyond carrying out government-approved actions and starts to look like 
environmental policy making.  In some cases, actions that look like 
category one (carrying out government-approved tasks) morph into 
category two (policy making).  This section offers two examples where 
private actors working in the mitigation realm may have greater power 
and reach than government agencies or the public realize.  First, I 
examine private mitigation banks working to protect both wetlands and 
endangered species habitat.  While governed by mitigation banking 
agreements and numerous laws, mitigation bank operators and 
subsequent landowners shape the projects more than many realize.  
Second, I look at the role played by land trusts.  Land trusts are nonprofit 
land conservation organizations and may take part in mitigation projects 
in multiple ways.104  Of particular note is the role they play in overseeing 
conservation easements preserving compensatory mitigation lands.  
These perpetual land-use restrictions are governed by agreements 
between the landowners and land trusts with minimal or absent 
government involvement and oversight.  I explain both mitigation banks 
and land trust mitigation below to set the stage for discussing concerns 
with private actors and mitigation tasks that appears in the following 
section. 
1. Mitigation Banks 
Mitigation programs under both the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act often enable permit applicants to meet their 
mitigation obligations by purchasing credits from an approved 
mitigation bank.105  Mitigation banks are areas that have been set aside 
to protect a particular natural resource, such as wetlands, streams, or 
endangered species habitat.106  They are designated for restoration, 
enhancement, and preservation of those natural resources.107  Sometimes 
 
 104.  LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, WETLAND AND STREAM MITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAND 
TRUSTS (2012), available at http://www.elistore.org/Data/products/d22_04.pdf. 
 105.  Morgan M. Robertson, The Neoliberalization of Ecosystem Services: Wetland Mitigation 
Banking and Problems in Environmental Governance, 35 GEOFORUM 361, 363 (2004); Federal 
Guidance, supra note 46 (describing wetland mitigation banking); Bonnie, supra note 1 (describing 
conservation banking). 
 106.  Federal Guidance, supra note 46 (describing wetland mitigation banking); Bonnie, supra 
note 1 (describing conservation banking); Rebecca Lave, Morgan M. Robertson, & Martin W. 
Doyle, Why You Should Pay Attention to Stream Mitigation Banking, 26 ECOLOGICAL 
RESTORATION 287 (2008) (describing stream mitigation banking). 
 107.  Federal Guidance, supra note 46. 
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they are also sites for creation or enhancement of resources.108 
Wetlands mitigation banks seek to provide for the replacement of 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of wetlands resources 
prior to the “unavoidable” impacts permitted under Section 404.109  The 
number of wetland mitigation banks is large and growing.  The Army 
Corps of Engineers began approving mitigation banks in the late 
1980s.110  From 1995 to 2005, there was a 780% increase in the number 
of banks.111  In 2005, there were 405 mitigation banks in thirty-one 
states (with twenty of those sold out).112  That number has more than 
doubled since.  As of January 2010, there were more than 950 wetland 
and stream mitigation banks, covering over 960,000 acres.113 
Habitat conservation banks protect habitats for listed and at-risk 
species.114  As off-site mitigation, these banks exist to offset adverse 
impacts to species occurring elsewhere.115  Sometimes it is a habitat that 
has been designated as “critical.”116  Conservation banking has had a 
shorter history than wetland banking, with the first governmental 
approval coming in the early 1990s.117  This aligns with the shorter 
history of habitat conservation planning (occurring first in the late 1980s 
with San Bruno Mountain in California) versus wetlands mitigation 
under the Clean Water Act (spurred by the 1977 amendments to the 
Clean Water Act).118  As of January 2009, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service approved over ninety conservation banks, covering over 90,000 
 
 108.  Kelly Chinners Reiss, Erica Hernandez, & Mark T. Brown, Evaluation of Permit Success 
in Wetland Mitigation Banking: A Florida Case Study, 29 WETLANDS 907, 907 (2009). 
 109.  Federal Guidance, supra note 46. 
 110.  Deborah L. Mead, History and Theory: The Origin and Evolution of Conservation 
Banking, in CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY BANKING: A GUIDE TO SETTING UP AND RUNNING 
BIODIVERSITY CREDIT TRADING SYSTEMS 9, 10 (Nathaniel Carroll, Jessica Fox, & Ricardo Bayon 
eds. 2008). 
 111.  Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 908.  
 112.  Id.  A sold out bank is one where all of the credits have already been disbursed to permit 
applicants and no further mitigation credit can come from the bank. 
 113.  WETLAND BANKING, NAT’L MITIGATION BANKING ASS’N, available at 
http://www.mitigationbanking.org/pdfs/2010-wetlandconservation.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012). 
 114.  Fox & Nino-Murcia, supra note 30; Bonnie, supra note 1. 
 115.  WETLAND BANKING, supra note 113. 
 116.  Kalyani Robbins, Recovery of an Endangered Provision: Untangling and Reviving 
Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 58 BUFF L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2010) 
(explaining the definition and role of critical habitat). 
 117.  WETLAND BANKING, supra note 113. 
 118.  Lindell L. Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New 
Paradigm for Conserving Biological Diversity, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 97, 98 (1994) (describing the 
San Bruno Mountain project and the beginning of habitat conservation planning); Hough & 
Robertson, supra note 12, at 17. 
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acres of habitat.119  Federal guidelines issued in 2003 outline the rules 
for bank operation.120 
Mitigation banks can be owned and operated by public or private 
entities.121  Early banks were public, often operated by state departments 
of transportation to consolidate mitigation for their own projects.122  
Private mitigation bank operators can be either for-profit companies or 
nonprofit conservation organizations.123  Like the early public banks, the 
first private wetlands mitigation bank was created to provide credits for 
the bank owner.124  When the bank had excess credits, it sought (and 
received) permission to sell those credits to others.125  Today, the 
majority of mitigation banks are private entrepreneurial ventures.126  
Where privately held, mitigation bank land must be encumbered by a 
conservation easement requiring the land to remain undeveloped and 
protected for that resource.127  Mitigation banks are governed by federal, 
 
 119.  Conservation Banks, NAT’L MITIGATION BANKING ASS’N, 
http://www.mitigationbanking.org/conservationbanks/index.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 120.  Guidance for the Establishment, Use, and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 
24,753 (Dep’t of Interior May 8, 2003); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE 
SERVICE, GUIDANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT, USE, AND OPERATION OF CONSERVATION BANKS 
(May 2, 2003), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-
library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf. 
 121.  Morgan Robertson & Nicholas Hayden, Evaluation of a Market in Wetland Credits: 
Entrepreneurial Wetland Banking in Chicago, 22 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 636, 638 (2008). 
 122.  Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 24. 
 123.  The Nature Conservancy is an example of a nonprofit land conservation organization that 
owns and operates mitigation banks.  See Mississippi: Old Fort Bayou Mitigation Bank: About, THE 
NATURE CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/mississippi/placesweprotect/
old-fort-bayou-mitigation-bank.xml (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).  The Nature Conservancy 
sometimes enters into joint partnerships with private banking companies or funders and sometimes 
with public agencies.  David Urban, Michael Dennis, & Richard Martin, Workshop at the Land 
Trust Alliance Rally in Salt Lake City, Utah: Land Trusts’ Interaction with Mitigation Banking: A 
Perspective From Both Sides (Oct. 1, 2012) (description available at 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/rally/rally-2012-salt-lake-city/rally-2012-workshop-grid) 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2013) (discussing partnership between The Nature Conservancy and Ecosystem 
Investment Partners); Mississippi: Red Creek Consolidated Mitigation Bank, THE NATURE 
CONSERVANCY, 
http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/mississippi/placesweprotect/
red-creek-consolidated-mitigation-bank.xml (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (describing mitigation bank 
co-sponsored by TNC and the Mississippi Department of Transportation). 
 124.  See Mead, supra note 110, at 9-10. 
 125.  Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 24. 
 126.  See id. at 25 (giving statistics for wetland mitigation banks). 
 127.  Memorandum from Director of Fish and Wildlife Service to Regional Directors, Regions 
1-7, Manager, California Nevada Operations 2-3 (May 2, 2003), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Conservation_Banking_Guidance.pdf; see also 
Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 913 (noting that wetland mitigation banks on public lands do not 
have conservation easements). 
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state, and local laws.128  For banks to qualify for participation in federal 
mitigation schemes under the Clean Water Act or Endangered Species 
Act, they must operate under a Mitigation Bank Agreement and follow 
the federal guidelines for mitigation banking.129  On top of these federal 
rules, there may be state laws governing the banks or local land-use and 
zoning ordinances that come into play.130 
Mitigation banks appear superior to individual projects because 
they are usually on larger parcels that are contiguous to other protected 
areas.131  The protection is not done on an ad-hoc basis, and land 
protection can occur in advance of permitted projects.132  Mitigation 
banks enable consolidation of resources and planning and expertise.133  
It is easier to oversee and manage banks.134  Arguably, efficiency is 
increased with their use. 
While mitigation banks may be desirable because they protect land 
pre-permit issuance, it may be that the presence of mitigation banks 
makes the approval of permits all the more likely.  That is, the banks 
may facilitate development and encourage the use of preservation as 
mitigation because of the ease of purchasing mitigation bank credits 
without needing to think critically about an individual project or 
ecosystem.  Mitigation banks have enabled the conversion of thousands 
of acres of wetlands and endangered species habitats, facilitating 
development of those lands. 
The public has a strong interest in ensuring that mitigation banks 
are worthwhile.  Several reviews of mitigation projects in general and 
mitigation banking in particular present worrisome pictures.  When 
considering mitigation banking, we can look at whether they have been 
successful ecologically and administratively.  Ecologically, we would 
hope to see mitigation banks providing meaningful resources that 
compensate for lost ecosystem functions.  This is challenging to assess 
as it involves in-depth investigation of a bank’s ecology and keeping 
track of it over time.  Administratively, we can assess whether banks 
have complied with rules regarding monitoring and reporting.  These 
aspects of the program interact.  Where there is a lack of administrative 
oversight, ecological outcomes may suffer. 
 
 128.  See Memorandum from Director of Fish and Wildlife Service, supra note 127, at 11. 
 129.  See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (describing process for conservation banks). 
 130.  See, e.g., id. at 3 (describing California’s state requirements for banks). 
 131.  Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 907. 
 132.  Id. at 908. 
 133.  Id. at 907-08. 
 134.  Id. at 908. 
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To begin with, it can be hard to determine the state of banking 
success because of the difficulty in accessing information about the 
banks.  Availability of permits and other documents vary greatly by 
mitigation bank.135  Additionally, studies of wetland mitigation banks 
have noted that monitoring reports are not always available for 
review.136  This represents an administrative failure.  Mitigation projects 
appear to often fail to comply with permit conditions.137  There are 
pervasive problems with monitoring, submitting reports, and performing 
long-term maintenance.138  Additionally, some banks fail to implement 
procedures outlined in their permits or mitigation banking agreements.139 
Public agencies overseeing banks have not always kept up with 
their obligations either.  A 2005 study by the Government 
Accountability Office revealed that the Army Corps of Engineers had 
inadequately performed its oversight duties.140  In fact, the GAO 
explained that, “Until the Corps takes its oversight responsibilities more 
seriously, it will not know if thousands of acres of compensatory 
mitigation have been performed and will be unable to ensure that the 
section 404 program is contributing to the national goal of no net loss of 
wetlands.”141  But there does appear to be greater confidence with 
banking than with permit-driven projects as it is easier for the Corps to 
monitor banks, and in some areas bank operators can develop 
relationships (and trust) with the government agencies that oversee 
them.142 
Ecologically, things are also worrisome.  Several studies of wetland 
mitigation conclude that mitigation projects have failed to replace lost 
wetland functions even where the overall number of acres under 
protection has risen.143  Some studies indicate numbers actually improve 
 
 135.  Id. at 909. 
 136.  Id. at 909. 
 137.  Rebecca L. Kihslinger, Success of Wetland Mitigation Projects, 30 NAT’L WETLANDS 
NEWSLETTER no. 2 p.14 (2008). 
 138.  See Mitsch & Wilson, supra note 25; Whigham, supra note 25; Hough & Robertson, 
supra note 12, at 24; Robertson, supra note 105 at 363. 
 139.  Kihslignger, supra note 137, at 15 (citing Michigan study where only twenty-nine percent 
of permits examined implemented the required amount of mitigation measures). 
 140.  U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-898, WETLANDS PROTECTION: 
CORPS OF ENGINEERS DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT APPROACH TO ENSURE THAT 
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IS OCCURRING (2005), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-898 [hereinafter GAO-05-898]; see also Sakyi, supra note 
42, at 1035. 
 141.  GAO-05-898, supra note 140, at 27. 
 142.  Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 25. 
 143.  Kihslignger, supra note 137, at 14. 
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for mitigation banks as opposed to permittee-driven projects, but the 
overall results are still dismaying.144  Other scientists argue that 
ecological outcomes are no better with mitigation banks than with other 
mitigation strategies.145 
Current policies encourage the use of mitigation banks.  While 
there may be both administrative and ecological benefits to this decision, 
it puts a lot reliance on private actors to carry out public permitting 
programs.  While some mitigation banks are publicly operated, many are 
privately owned by either nonprofit organizations like The Nature 
Conservancy or for-profit companies.  These for-profit or entrepreneur 
(or enviroprenuer as PERC labels them)146 operators are increasingly 
running the bulk of mitigation banks.147 
Mitigation banking shifts administrative burdens to private entities 
specializing in the field.  When a permittee purchases credits from a 
mitigation bank, it is the bank that assumes responsibility for the 
mitigation project.148  It is not clear what happened if the mitigation 
banks fail to achieve their ecological goals.  The permit will not be 
revoked because the permittee has satisfied her commitment by 
purchasing the credits.  But there is little oversight, especially after 
banks are sold out.  For example, some bank operators transfer the land 
after the bank is established and sold-out.149  Now neither the permittee 
nor the bank operator is involved with the permit-required mitigation.  
There is no system to ensure that mitigation projects are performing at 
the promised level of efficiency, and it is not clear what would happen if 
they were not.  There is a heavy reliance on good faith of bank 
 
 144.  Id. at 14. 
 145.  Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 25. 
 146.  PROP. § ENV’T RESEARCH CTR., http://perc.org/programs/perc-
enviropreneurs/enviropreneur-institute (last visited Dec. 21, 2012); Q&A with Enviropenuer Kelly 
Sands Siragusa On Conservation Banking, PERC: THE PERCOLARTOR (THE PERC BLOG), 
http://perc.org/blog/qa-enviropreneur-kelly-sands-siragusa-conservation-banking (last visited Mar. 
16, 2013).  
 147.  Mark Landry, Antje Siems, Gerald Stedge & Leonard Shabman, Applying Lessons 
Learned from Wetlands Mitigation Banking to Water Quality Trading 4-9 (White Paper Prepared 
for the Environmental Protection Agency 2005), available at 
http://www.eli.org/pdf/wqtforum/LanSiemStedShab05.pdf. 
 148.  Id. at 6 (explaining that permittees are no longer responsible for the success of mitigation 
programs where they have purchased credits from a bank—in contrast to permitee-driven projects 
where they retain such responsibility). 
 149.  See, e.g., Panzners Donate Living Laboratory to UA, http://www.uakron.edu/im/online-
newsroom/news_details.dot?newsId=4f2fd318-c44b-4183-a1c2-
3f977e4b974e&crumbTitle=Panzners%20donate%20living%20laboratory%20to%20UA 
(describing donation of sold-out wetland mitigation bank land to the University of Akron who now 
bears the burden of protecting the wetland ecosystem at a high level of functionality). 
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operators.150 
As operators of the mitigation banks, private actors have a lot of 
control over what lands to protect and how to protect them.  While the 
banks must be certified, without adequate (and continual) oversight, the 
bank operators make the decisions regarding what types of ecological 
restoration to do.151  They can also determine the fate of the bank after 
the credits have all been sold.  In these ways, bank operators play a more 
important role in shaping mitigation projects than regulators do.  What 
first appeared a ministerial task shifts to policy-making as these private 
actors determine the contours, rules, and future of natural resource 
conservation. 
2. Land Trusts and Conservation Easements 
Many public agencies encourage mitigation banks, but even more 
call upon the power of land trusts and conservation easements.152  Land 
trusts are nonprofit land conservation organizations.153  Among their 
land conservation strategies are holding fee simple title and conservation 
easements over property that they have identified as worthy of 
protection.154  Some land trusts also work with public agencies to 
monitor and manage lands owned by others.155  An even smaller number 
operate mitigation banks.156 
Land trusts often hold conservation easements associated with 
compensatory mitigation.157  These exacted conservation easements are 
created to satisfy mitigation requirements in numerous laws including 
local land-use ordinances, state laws protecting natural resources, and 
 
 150.  Sakyi, supra note 42, at 1036. 
 151.  See generally MITIGATION BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 37-54 (David Salvesen, 
Lindell L. Marsh, Douglas R. Porter eds., 1996) (describing the mitigation banking process). 
 152.  See, e.g., Jessica Owley & Stephen Tulowiecki, The Future of Private Forests: 
Conservation Easements and the Forest Legacy Program, 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 47, 
71 (2012) (discussing the role of land trusts in the Forest Legacy Program); Jessica Owley, Use of 
Conservation Easements by Local Governments, in GREENING LOCAL GOVERNMENT 237 (Patricia 
Salkin & Keith Hirokawa eds. 2012) [hereinafter Owley, Use of Conservative Easements] 
(discussing conservation easement use by local governments); Christopher Serkin, Entrenching 
Environmentalism: Private Conservation Easements over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 
343-45 (2010) (providing example of conservation easement use by the town of Marlboro). 
 153.  LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUSTS, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts (last 
visited Dec. 21, 2012). 
 154.  See, e.g., Owley, Use of Conservative Easements, supra note 152, at 244-46 (describing 
conservation easement holdings of the Town of Dunn in Wisconsin and New York City). 
 155.  Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 152, at 89-90. 
 156.  See, e.g., supra note 123. 
 157.  See, e.g., Building Indus. Ass’n v. Cnty of Stanislaus, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 478 (2010) 
(describing potential role of land trusts in an agricultural land mitigation program). 
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federal laws like the permitting programs of Section 404 of Clean Water 
Act and Section 10 of the Endangered Species Act.158  As holders of 
exacted conservation easements, land trusts have the task of stewarding 
an essential element of the environmental regulatory regime.  They 
oversee and have enforcement responsibility for one of the major 
mitigation methods. 
Conservation easements are non-possessory rights in land that have 
environmental purposes.159  When a conservation easement burdens land 
it either prohibits the landowner from doing something she would have 
otherwise been permitted to do or it enables someone else to do 
something on her land that she would have been otherwise able to 
prohibit.160  Some conservation easements do both—restricting the 
landowner’s behavior and giving the land trust rights or obligations to 
conduct activities on the land.  The rules for conservation easements 
generally come from state law.161  These state laws define rules for 
conservation easements including acceptable purposes and holders.162  
They also sometimes detail the methods for termination or modification 
of the agreements.163  Almost all states allow government agencies and 
nonprofit organizations with conservation goals to hold conservation 
easements.164 
Conservation easements look like private contracts but are actually 
servitudes,165 usually burdening land in perpetuity.166  They are a 
favored tool of permit-issuing agencies for preservation components of 
compensatory mitigation.  For example, where a mitigation program 
requires preservation of existing wetlands, agencies require some 
guarantee that the preservation will be more than temporary.167  One way 
to do this is to require a permit applicant to purchase credits from a 
 
 158.  Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements, supra note 69; Jessica Owley, The Emergence 
of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEBRASKA L. REV. 1043 (2006); Jessica Owley, The 
Enforceability of Exacted Conservation Easements, 36 VERMONT L. REV. 261 (2011). 
 159.  ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT 
HANDBOOK, 14-15 (2d ed. 2005). 
 160.  4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.01 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  4 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34A.03[1]; Todd D. Mayo, A Holistic Examination of 
the Law of Conservation Easements, in PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 26, 27-31 & 35-40 (Julie Ann Gustanski & Roderick H. Squires eds., 2000). 
 163.  Mayo, supra note 162, at 42-45. 
 164.  California and Oregon add recognized tribes to the list while Arizona does not recognize 
the ability of government entities to hold CEs.  
 165.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §1.1 cmt. d (2000). 
 166.  Mayo, supra note 162, at 40-42. 
 167.  W.A. Weems & Larry W. Cantor, Planning And Operational Guidelines For Mitigation 
Banking For Wetland Impacts, 15 ENVTL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 197, 206 (1995). 
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mitigation bank and then oversee the mitigation bank with various rules 
and requirements as discussed above.  Another approach is to use 
property law tools to restrict potential conflicting land uses on the 
preserved wetlands.  Traditional covenants may work in some 
jurisdictions and on some properties, but increasingly agencies are 
requiring conservation easements.  These perpetual restrictions can 
circumscribe the use of land and help to ensure that the wetlands remain 
wetlands.168 
There are no specific requirements for land trusts holding exacted 
conservation easements.  State conservation easement laws sometimes 
outline the details of what types of organizations are permissible holders, 
but these standards are broad and it is not even clear that they would 
apply to land trusts operating under a federal scheme.169  There is no 
specification as to size, capacity, or experience of the land trust.170  
There are no regulations requiring them to follow certain procedures.  
The Land Trust Alliance has created an accreditation program for land 
trusts and has its own standards and practices that it urges land trusts to 
follow.171  Accreditation, a form of private standard setting, is voluntary, 
and the Alliance is limited in the number of land trust accreditation 
applications it can process each year.172  Moreover, the public agencies 
governing mitigation processes have not required accreditation. 
As with mitigation bank operators, land trusts play a significant role 
in federal permitting programs, and this trend is steadily increasing.  
Both the number of land trusts (now numbering around 1,700) and the 
number of conservation easements is increasing.173  Conservation 
easement use in mitigation projects is well established and trend reversal 
seems unlikely.  As holders of exacted conservation easements, land 
 
 168.  Perhaps this is overstating the ability of conservation easements.  They can seek to 
prevent land uses that would conflict with wetlands, but few conservation easements include 
affirmative obligations or active management. See Jessica Owley, Conservation Easements at the 
Climate Change Crossroads, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 199 (2011).  Where wetlands are at 
risk due to climate change or offsite actions, conservation easements will not be able to ensure that 
the wetland remains a wetland, only that property owners do not drain or fill the wetland directly. 
 169.  See Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements, supra note 69, at 54. 
 170.  See Owley & Tulowiecki, supra note 152, at 89-90.  
 171.  Accreditation, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 172.  Getting Accredited, LAND TRUST ACCREDITATION COMM’N, 
http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/the-process (last visited Jan. 22, 2013). 
 173.  Katie Change, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE & LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, 2010 
NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS (Nov. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010-
final-report (indicating that there may be some leveling off in the number of land trusts while the 
number of acres of land protected and number of conservation easements contains to increase). 
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trusts play a fundamental role in shaping mitigation programs.  There are 
even fewer rules governing conservation easement use than governing 
mitigation banks.  It is common for permits to require conservation 
easements without detailing where the conservation easement will be, 
who will hold it, or what its terms will be.  Public agencies rarely 
maintain a legal interest in the conservation easements (by becoming co-
holders or third-party enforcers for example). 
Even where permits include conservation easement details, the land 
trusts remain in control of the mitigation.  Unlike the situation with 
mitigation banks, there are no requirements for monitoring reports or 
continued public oversight.  Presumably the land trusts have a free hand 
in amending, terminating, and enforcing the conservation easements.  
While accreditation repercussions or obligations related to tax or 
charitable trust law maintain checks on the land trusts, the environmental 
laws (and the environmental permitting agencies) do not have a voice in 
key decisions regarding the conservation easements. In fact, the land 
trusts’ power to shape the conservation easement boundaries and rules 
means that they have the power to shape mitigation policy. 
C. Benefits of Private Mitigation Programs 
The above outline of private mitigation programs already indicates 
where some concerns relating to this form of privatization might emerge.  
There are, however, many strengths that private actors can bring to the 
table.  For example, private conservation organizations may have greater 
expertise in land conservation techniques, may be able to operate more 
quickly and flexibly, and may have motivation to find innovative ways 
to increase land protection.174 
Land trusts and mitigation bank operators work closely with the 
land and may have sophisticated understandings of the parcels on which 
they operate.  Land trust staff, for example, is often composed of long-
standing community members.175  They may have even better 
understanding of local weather patterns and ecological features than the 
public agencies.  In particular, they might have superior knowledge of 
 
 174.  Starr, supra note 71, at 129 (explaining that local contractors develop knowledge and 
expertise associated with their areas of operation). 
 175.  See, e.g., Land Trust Staff, DESCHUTES LAND TRUST, 
http://www.deschuteslandtrust.org/about-us/staff (displaying land trust staff profiles demonstrating 
long term involvement in the local community) (last visited Jan. 4, 2013); Staff, SOLANO LAND 
TRUST, http://www.solanolandtrust.org/Staff.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (same); Flathead Land 
Trust Staff, FLATHEAD LAND TRUST, FLATHEAD LAND TRUST, 
http://www.flatheadlandtrust.org/about%20us/staff.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013) (same). 
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local access points and potential struggles (trespassing, dumping, lack of 
community support).  Moreover, permittees may feel more comfortable 
working with private organizations than with government agencies 
where relations may be hostile, or permit applicants resentful.176 
Many proponents of privatization assert that it is more efficient to 
allow private organizations to take on public duties instead of increasing 
government bureaucracy.177  In conserving land, private agencies may be 
able to acquire important parcels quicker and may have access to 
additional funding sources.178  Land trusts can often work quickly to 
protect lands in advance of threats.179  They can harness public support 
and acquire large parcels faster than government agencies and 
potentially with less local opposition.180 
Private organizations may also be able to provide services similar to 
those provided by public agencies but at reduced costs.181  Many land 
trusts for example use volunteers for monitoring conservation 
easements.182  Even paid employees may be cheaper than public 
employees because of reduced overhead costs including salaries, 
benefits, and costs associated with bureaucracies.  Some theorists argue, 
however, that efficiency arguments are “bogus.”183  For example, 
Buchheit argues that often privately-run systems like schools, hospitals, 
and prisons are more costly.184 
Private organizations may be more innovative as well.185  When it 
comes to management decisions regarding the lands, they may have a 
freer hand than agencies do to experiment with different land 
conservation techniques or rules.  Land trusts could consider 
conservation easement amendments or even land swaps.  Mitigation 
 
 176.  EVE ENDICOTT, LAND CONSERVATION THROUGH PUBLIC/PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 5 
(1993). 
 177.  Louis Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups¸ 51 HARV. L. REV. 201, 212 (1937).  
 178.  ENDICOTT, supra note 176, at 19-21. 
 179.  Id. at 17-22. 
 180.  Id. at 4-5. 
 181.  Many scholars have acknowledged and documented the budgetary constraints on 
environmental agencies. See, e.g., JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND 
HARD CHOICES 114-15 (1995). 
 182.  Dominic Parker, Cost-Effective Strategies for Conserving Private Land: An Economic 
Analysis for Land Trusts and Policy Makers, PERC 17 (2002), 
http://perc.org/sites/default/files/land_trusts_02.pdf.  
 183.  Paul Buchheit, Fives Ways Privatization Degrades America, NATION OF CHANGE (Aug. 
13, 2012), available at http://www.nationofchange.org/five-ways-privatization-degrades-america-
1344864526; see also Starr, supra note 71, at 128-129 (explaining that cost savings do not always 
accompany privatization). 
 184.  Buchheit, supra note 183; Starr, supra note 71. 
 185.  Freeman, supra note 70, at 848; Jaffe, supra note 177, at 212. 
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banks can experiment with different restoration, creation, and 
enhancement techniques in attempts to increase the value of their banks.  
Profit-maximizing motives will align with a desire to increase wetland 
function and habitat value.  This may lead to more innovation and 
experimentation than we would expect to see with public agencies that 
do not feel the same economic pressure. 
D. Concerns with Private Mitigation 
While private actors may have strengths that could improve 
environmental outcomes, the concerns regarding their involvement are 
substantial.  The concerns appear on two fronts.  First, there are 
theoretical and moral concerns regarding private actors making 
mitigation policy.  In presenting those concerns, I offer a variety of 
examples of how public participation is marginalized, accountability is 
questionable and transparency is lacking.  Another way to examine the 
use of private actors is to consider outcomes.  In thinking about the 
actual effects of the private actors we may be particularly concerned by 
their capacity to carry out their stewardship obligations and their 
effectiveness as land restorationists and conservationists. 
1. Democratic Legitimacy 
Assessing democratic legitimacy calls on us to ask whether the 
people exercising the authority are morally authorized to do so.186  Such 
an inquiry must begin with examining the authority being exercised.  
When contracting out, we need to consider who has the policy-making 
authority and who has the day-to-day management.187  We are likely 
more concerned with the first category than the second.  Here, we have 
private actors making decisions about mitigation.  They decide how the 
mitigation will be conducted, whether it will be enforced, and how long 
it will persist.  An operating underlying assumption is that land 
conservation and protection of natural resources is an appropriate role 
for government, in fact a duty of public agencies.188  By relying upon 
 
 186.  PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2007). 
 187.  See Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against Privatization, PHILOSOPHY & PUB. 
AFFAIRS 7-9 (2013 forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103365 (discussing the 
types of decisions private actors make); see also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political 
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1513 (2001) (questioning the constitutionality of 
some delegations). 
 188.  I make this assumption somewhat blithely here but fully understand that many would not 
agree with it. I save that debate for another day, so we can remain focused on the actions of the 
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private actors (combined with minimal oversight of those actors), 
government agencies contract out a significant part of their 
environmental permitting programs.  Alternatively, it could be 
democracy enhancing to use private actors.189  Folks may be more likely 
to get involved in local groups.  They may be more willing to abide by 
rules that they helped to establish.  Basic principles of democracy 
require public participation in the democratic process and accountability 
(including review of actions).  Assessing levels of participation and 
accountability requires some level of reviewability. 
a. Public Participation 
Citizen participation is often listed as one of the primary elements 
of democracy.190  Citizens participate in environmental permitting 
programs through a few different avenues.  Initially, they can participate 
in the public review processes.  Both Section 404 permits and incidental 
take permits go through lengthy public review processes.191  Rules from 
the governing statutes as well as the Administrative Procedure Act 
require public notice and comment processes for the issuance of any 
permits.  Additionally, the issuance of a federal permit triggers review 
under the National Environmental Policy Act.192 
Unfortunately, it is rare for the conservation easements or land 
trusts to be subject to such review.  Often neither (1) the identity of the 
land trusts that will be involved nor (2) the details of the conservation 
easements are known at the time the permit is deliberated and discussed.  
While some agencies are moving toward including sample conservation 
easements in the permits of associated environmental review 
documents,193 the timing of the permit approval process means that some 
of the core elements of the agreements escape review.  This is less so for 
mitigation banks because they are more commonly established before 
permit issuance.  In such cases, the public may be able to review 
 
private mitigation actors. 
 189.  Freeman, supra note 70, at 848. 
 190.  See, e.g., Democracy for All, STREET LAW, www.streetlaw.org/democlesson.html (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 191.  33 C.F.R. § 327 (2013) (describing public hearings and comment procedures applicable 
to Section 404 permits, issuance of which triggers NEPA review); HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 66, 
at ch. 6. 
 192.  COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO NEPA REVIEW: 
HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 5 (2007); HCP HANDBOOK, supra note 191, at 6-3 (describing NEPA 
review in Section 10 permits). 
 193.  See, e.g., Sample Conservation Easement from St. John’s Water Management District, at 
http://www.sjrwmd.com/rules/pdfs/consv_easement_corps.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). 
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mitigation banking agreements or conservation easements burdening 
land within banks, but as the agreements are already completed before 
permits are issued review processes for those projects are unable to 
influence the terms of such agreements or the management of the 
mitigation lands.  Once mitigation programs are in place, there is no 
requirement for public review of any changes to the land or documents. 
Citizens can also participate in environmental permitting programs 
as public enforcers or whistleblowers.  Both the Clean Water Act and the 
Endangered Species Act contain citizen suit provisions enabling suits for 
permit enforcement.194  This law enables private individuals (who can 
show standing) to enforce wetland fill permits and incidental take 
permits.  This gets murky with conservation easements though.  It is not 
clear whom one would bring a citizen suit against.  The permittees have 
absolved themselves of responsibility through the purchase of mitigation 
bank credits or conservation easements.  Thus, bringing an action for 
permit violations doesn’t really work.  It is not clear citizens would have 
a cause of action against the private contractors.  Particularly if courts 
hold that such conservation easements are governed by state 
conservation easement statutes, few citizens would be able to challenge 
such violations.  Indeed, many states limit conservation easement 
enforcers to the holder and potentially the state Attorney General. 
b. Accountability 
Some of the factors that hinder public participation also affect 
accountability.  Accountability concerns emerge when it appears that the 
private contractors are insulated from legislative, executive, and judicial 
oversight.195  This is certainly a concern with private mitigation 
enforcers.  To begin with, the private actors conducting mitigation and 
making mitigation policy are not popularly elected.  As revealed above, 
it is also infrequent that members of the public even participate in the 
choice of public actor (which land trust, which bank) that carries out the 
mitigation duty.  When we are unhappy with actions by agencies, we can 
 
 194.  33 U.S.C. 1365 (2013); 16 U.S.C § 1540(g) (2013). 
 195.  These same accountability concerns also surround agencies themselves.  Many 
administrative law scholars have discussed concerns of accountability in the so-called “Fourth 
Branch” of government.  See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 70, at n.1; JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED 
CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Kathleen 
Bawn, Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the 
Committee System, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101 (1997).  I am not arguing here that agencies are 
perfect, simply that concerns we already have with accountability and democracy are still present 
and often increased when private actors are involved. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 4, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss4/10
VOL. 46, NO. 4 - ARTICLE 9 OWLEY (DO NOT DELETE) 9/19/2013  3:20 PM 
2013] THE INCREASING PRIVATIZATION 1121 
react by bringing legal challenges or by voting for new executive 
officers or legislative representatives.196  When unhappy with actions by 
private actors, we can try those same avenues, hoping that actions 
against public officers and branches will send the message that we are 
dissatisfied with the private actors, but that is an attenuated message that 
is difficult to convey.197  And the judicial review options simply seem 
absent. 
We might also have concerns about contracting out because the 
private actors involved are not necessarily expected to serve the public 
interest.  Public choice theory tells us that bureaucrats rationally pursue 
their own interests.198  Following this theory, private groups will also 
work to benefit themselves at the expense of others.  This can be in 
conflict with ideals of civic republicanism that tells us that government 
is supposed to be a moral force for the common good (not a vehicle for 
personal gain).199  A company running a mitigation bank may just be 
seeking to engage in a profitable business venture.  Their oversight of 
the wetlands they are protecting may seek to ensure functioning 
wetlands or meet certain requirements simply to meet contractual 
requirements not because the company wants to do all it can to protect 
wetlands.  For land trusts and mitigation banks, their clients are the 
landowners and permittees, not the government agencies overseeing the 
mitigation programs.  This may offer some indication as to motivations 
of these private actors.  They may be more focused on things like 
maximizing profits, making donors happy, and maintaining amiable 
relationships with neighbors.  Democratic legitimacy and accountability 
are strengthened by impartiality.  That can be lacking here. 
This concern may be lessened for land trusts compared to 
entrepreneurial mitigation banks.  As nonprofit charitable organizations, 
land trusts do have an obligation to support the public interest.  Under 
many conservation easements statutes, the organizations must have 
conservation as one of their core goals or values.200  In this way, these 
organizations have obligations to the public through state laws regarding 
 
 196.  See Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003). 
 197.  Starr, supra note 71, at 125. 
 198.  Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Introduction: A Brief Trajectory of Public 
Choice Theory and Public Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 4 
(Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010). 
 199.  PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52 (1997) 
(defining liberty in terms of non-domination). 
 200.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-18-1 (2013); FLA. STAT. ch. 704.06(3) (2013). 
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charitable organizations.201  In her work, Jody Freeman suggests that 
private organizations may have mechanisms that increase the likelihood 
that public interest will be served even if the organizations are private 
and thus not subject to typical restrictions that agencies must abide by.202  
Both land trusts and mitigation bank operators are constrained by a host 
of laws as well as industry norms.  Thus, there are practices and attitudes 
governing their work that may be even more effective than agency 
oversight.  The organizations must be responsive to their members, 
boards, and investors.  Where nonprofit organizations are involved, we 
might have even greater solace as they may not operate in ways simply 
designed to maximize profits or client satisfaction.  Land trusts also have 
organization norms from the Land Trust Alliance and external standards 
for charitable organizations that may make them more responsive to the 
public interest than the owner of the for-profit wetlands mitigation bank. 
c. Transparency 
Although both the permits and conservation easements are public 
documents, they are not equally easy to track down.  Where one can 
obtain a permit, it may be difficult to also get a copy of the conservation 
easement that embodies the mitigation required in the permit.  The 
mitigation details may be hidden from view.  Thus, we have to overcome 
the threshold issue of obtaining information.  It is impossible to get 
comprehensive information on how and where conservation easements 
are being created and whether they are being monitored.  An extensive 
effort to track conservation easements through online registries, county 
recorder office documents, and spatial data in California revealed 
piecemeal tracking systems, leading scholars to recommend new 
tracking systems that include information on conservation easement 
locations, terms, and greater monitoring of the monitors.203 
It can be challenging just to learn when there is a problem.  For 
example, I examined the Section 10 incidental take permit for San Bruno 
Mountain.204  Examining the associated Habitat Conservation Plan 
 
 201.  Nancy A. McLaughlin, Extinguishing and Amending Tax-Deductible Conservation 
Easements: Protecting the Federal Investment after Carpenter, Simmons, and Kaufman, 13 FLA. 
TAX REV. 217, 281 (2012). 
 202.  See infra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 203.  Amy Morris & Adena R. Rissman, Public Access to Information on Private Land 
Conservation: Tracking Conservation Easements, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1239, 1281 (2009); see 
also James L. Olmsted, The Invisible Forest: Conservation Easement Databases and the End of the 
Clandestine Conservation of Natural Lands, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (2011) (describing the 
need for a transparent, comprehensive, and easy to use conservation easement database). 
 204.  Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements 146-148 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. 
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reveals references to the developers’ intention to use habitat easements 
to meet mitigation needs.205  The plan did not explain in any detail what 
the conservation easements would look like, where they would be 
located, or who would hold them.206  Tracking down those conservation 
easements was challenging.  Repeated phone calls and emails to the 
public agencies, consultants, and developers only unearthed one 
conservation easement (even though many acknowledged that 
conservation easements were used pervasively in the project).207  Thus, 
even where I knew conservation easements were operating, I could not 
locate copies of them or learn who held them. 
Beyond locating permits and associated mitigation documents, it 
can be difficult to determine when permits violations occur.  First, if we 
can’t find the documents, we have no way of knowing whether the 
mitigation programs are being carried out correctly (if at all).  Under the 
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act, citizens can bring suit 
against permit violators (or indeed any violators of the statute).208  But 
the struggle of finding the information makes it challenging to learn of 
when permit violations occur. 
Furthermore, because conservation easements and mitigation bank 
practices lack consistency, it can be even harder to assess them.  To 
understand the mitigation requirements, one must look at each individual 
agreement because the terms could be quite different.  The permits and 
mitigation bank agreements differ by state, by agency office 
administering the program, by the private contractor involved.  
Additionally, individual landowners and permittees may add other 
requirements or provisions.  When the conservation easements are 
written by different holders and there is no agency guidance or model 
conservation easement, there is a lack of consistency in permitting.  
Mitigation requirements in permits may effectively vary because of the 
nuances and requirements of the different holders involved. 
2. Conservation Outcomes 
The preceding section presented theoretical concerns with 
privatization of mitigation.  That is, we have concerns regarding who is 
 
dissertation, Univ. of California, Berekeley) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Owley, dissertation].  
 205.  SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN. I-3, SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN 
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLAN IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT, §V; see Owley, dissertation, supra 
note 204, at 148-49. 
 206.  See Owley, dissertation, supra note 204, at 150-55. 
 207.  Id. at 146-48. 
 208.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2013).  
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the appropriate entity to make mitigation policy and there are many 
structural reasons that make us worry about the legitimacy of the current 
system.  An important question though is whether privatization matters 
on the ground.209  Do we see different results when private actors 
structure and carrying out conservation programs?  What are the actual 
conservation outcomes?  Unfortunately, because of the problems with 
obtaining information about the system, it is hard to assess conservation 
outcomes.  We can however, examine some of the aspects of these 
private organizations to obtain information about their capacity for 
successful conservation work. 
Capacity concerns abound with land trusts and mitigation banks.  
Although many programs require conservation banking agreements, 
there are no statutes, regulations, or even agency guidance outlining 
acceptable private organizations for these programs.  Outside state 
conservation easement laws putting constraints on holders, there are no 
standards to which they must comply.  Many land trusts are run by 
volunteers.  There are no requirements about volunteer or staff 
qualification.  Nothing requires specific expertise or levels of 
experience. 
Recently, the Land Trust Alliance led an effort to standardize land 
trusts by asking their land trust members to adopt the Alliance’s 
Standards and Practices and by creating an accreditation program.210  
The environmental permit programs do not require land trusts to have 
adopted the Standards and Practices or to be accredited.211  Of course, 
self-regulation makes some nervous because there can be a lack of hard 
performance standards, little transparency or public involvement, and it 
can be hard to monitor the standards set by others.212  Voluntary 
 
 209.  See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Triangulating the Administrative State, 78 CAL. L. REV. 
1415, 1425 (1990) (suggesting that the important issue in administrative law is achievement of 
public policy goals, not determining and ensuring reviewability). 
 210.  LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, LAND TRUST STANDARDS AND PRACTICES, (2004), available at 
https://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf; Accreditation, LAND 
TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last visited April 10, 
2013). 
 211.  I take no position on the adequacy or appropriateness of LTA’s Standards and Practices 
or accreditation process.  I simply point out that even though these external standards have emerged, 
the public permitting agencies have not required land trust partners to comply with those standards.  
Nor have they set standards for the land trusts either. 
 212.  Deborah L. Rhode & Alice Woolley, Comparative Perspectives on Lawyer Regulation: 
An Agenda for Reform in the United States and Canada, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2761, 2775-76 
(2012) (discussing concerns with self-regulation in the context of law societies); Hope M. Babcock, 
Corporate Environmental Social Responsibility: Corporate “Greenwashing” or a Corporate 
Culture Game Changer?, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 52 (2010); Jody Freeman, The Private 
Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 647 (2000). 
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measures could pose “a serious threat to the legitimacy of environmental 
regulation.”213 
Capacity and oversight concerns merge with the issue of 
enforcement.  Repercussions for lack of enforcement are unclear.  What 
do we do when private groups are not good at environmental protection?  
There are lots of flaws with public actors, but the response is a bit 
clearer.  We have a general sense of what our legal and political options 
are when we don’t think a public agency is doing the right thing, but this 
gets harder when we are looking at the actions of a private party.  What 
happens when the land trust does not enforce the conservation easement?  
This may happen by mistake (the land trust does not realize that there is 
a violation) or quite consciously.  The land trust may decide that the 
infractions are not worth the expense of enforcement and litigation.  The 
land trust may determine that the property is not really that valuable.214  
Thus, whether the decision not to enforce is due to a lack of capacity or 
is a strategic one, it is not clear what recourses are available when 
enforcement does not occur. 
A similar issue arises with mitigation banks.  Without consistent 
study and oversight, it is hard to know whether mitigation banks are 
delivering promised ecological benefits.  In 2001, the National Resource 
Counsel reviewed federal wetlands mitigation and found several 
disturbing things.215  First, there was a high rate of noncompliance with 
mitigation plans.216  The long-term monitoring and management of the 
mitigation projects was limited (often with inadequate funding).217  
Other studies supported these findings,218 including a 2005 study from 
the Government Accountability Office.219  The GAO study noted that 
 
 213.  Freeman, supra note 70, at 833. 
 214.  I do not mean to convey that this is something that would happen commonly.  Land trusts 
tend to be watchful diligent enforcers.  In fact, they are likely better at overseeing conservation 
easements than public holders are.  The point here is that it is not clear what to do when a land trust 
does not live up to this ideal (something that would occur infrequently but is still likely to occur). 
 215.  NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), COMPENSATING FOR 
WETLAND LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT (2001). 
 216.  Id. at 6; Kihslinger, supra note 137, at 14. 
 217.  NRC, supra note 215, at 138. 
 218.  See, e.g., D. J. Spieles, Vegetation Development in Created, Restored, and Enhanced 
Mitigation Wetland Banks of the United States, 25 WETLANDS 51-63 (2005).  See also R. Eugene 
Turner, Ann M. Redmond, & Joy B. Zedler, Count It by Acre of Function—Mitigation Adds Up to 
Net Loss of Wetlands, NAT’L WETLANDS NEWSLETTER (Environmental Law Institute, Washington 
D.C.) vol. 23, no. 60, 2001, at 5, available at 
http://ftp.epchc.org/EPC_Wetlands_FTP/Hart/Imp%20Comp%20Mit%20Tampa%20Bay%20Water
sheds/Literature/Ck081-ch18.pdf. 
 219.  GAO-05-898, supra note 140, at 27. 
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the permit performance and success criteria were inadequate.220  
Mitigation sites were not well located and there was inadequate agency 
support for compliance monitoring, tracking, training, or research.221  
The studies generally demonstrated that projects minimized the 
avoidance option (what should have been prong one of a mitigation 
program) and jumped to focusing on compensation.222 
It is not clear what a concerned citizen could do upon discovering a 
poorly operated mitigation bank.  There are no avenues for public 
oversight or enforcement.  Land trusts involved with holding 
conservation easements on mitigation banks admit that many of them 
protect marginal sites and provide little habitat.223  Old mitigation banks 
(especially those that have changed ownership) face problems with the 
continual maintenance needed to maintain the purported ecological value 
of the site. 
As I have written elsewhere, we may be able to find some legal 
hooks to allow enforcement by government agencies, attorneys general, 
or even through citizen suits.224  An added conundrum is who to enforce 
against and what are we enforcing.  Are we enforcing the conservation 
easement, the mitigation banking agreement, or are we enforcing the 
permit?  The conservation easement was a requirement of the permit and 
incorporated into the permit by reference usually.  Is that enough to 
make conservation easement terms permit terms?  If so, then violation of 
the conservation easement could be considered violation of the permit 
and enforced by any party that would have the ability to enforce the 
permit.  But enforcement of the permit may not be entirely satisfying if 
the remedies are permit revocation or fines from the permit holder.  
Overall, we are left with a lot of uncertainty regarding these private 
mitigation operations. 
IV. CONCLUSION: HARNESSING STRENGTHS WHILE MINIMIZING HARMS 
Current market problems have led to cash-strapped governments.  
Public agencies without funding for conservation turn to conservation 
 
 220.  Id. at 17. 
 221.  See also Reiss et al., supra note 108, at 909 (describing a study in Florida). 
 222.  James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 653 (2000); Shirley Jeanne Whitsitt, Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 3 ENVTL. 
LAW. 441, 454 (1997); J. B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into 
Environmental Law: A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 365, 370 
(2001); Hough & Robertson, supra note 12, at 23. 
 223.  Confidential interviews with Land Trust Staff and Attorneys. 
 224.  See supra notes 152-158. 
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easements and mitigation banks as an attractive option.  This move is an 
unrecognized form of privatization or contracting out.225  As with other 
instances of privatization, we must consider the appropriateness of the 
privatization of mitigation and then assess what the appropriate contours 
of the privatized actions should be.  Some believe privatization is the 
solution to all budget woes.  Trying to figure out environmental 
conservation is challenging and expensive.226  Privatization is not a 
magic pill though.227  We do not suddenly figure out a solution to this 
conundrum by handing the task over to private organizations. 
The nontrivial concerns raised above concerning democratic 
legitimacy, capacity, and enforcement indicate a need to change the 
current structure of private mitigation efforts.  There are three main 
options.  First, we could limit the role of private actors, decreasing or 
restricting the amount of contracting out.  Second, we could treat the 
private actors more like public actors applying public information and 
accountability laws to these entities.  Third, we could explore alternative 
routes to enhance accountability and address other concerns. 
Who are the legitimate actors here?  We assume that public actors 
are legitimate while private actors are not.  We need to assess what 
makes agencies more legitimate than private groups to explore how 
private organizations can increase their legitimacy.  In assessing how to 
proceed, we need to consider whether we should accept the increasing 
contracting out as the correct approach, an inevitable but troublesome 
concept or something that we can and should prevent.  Is private 
authority in some realms so ill-advised that we should avoid or minimize 
it?  Without clear data on conservation outcomes, it is hard to determine 
whether privatization of mitigation has been a good thing.  Enabling the 
use of private entities in addition to public actors appears to increase the 
capacity for conservation work (perhaps while simultaneously increasing 
the capacity for development and conversion of important ecological 
systems). 
Even without conservation outcomes, we may feel that mitigation 
and permit compliance is an inappropriate duty for agencies to delegate.  
There are some tasks that we may feel are best done by government.228  
 
 225.  These reasons illustrate why we see contracting out at all levels of government.  See, 
Freeman, supra note 70, at 820.  Indeed local governments with smaller staff and reduced 
bureaucracy may be the most likely to seek external assistance for carrying out permitting and 
mitigation programs.  
 226.  See generally Daniel J. Fiorino, Rethinking Environmental Regulation: Perspectives on 
Law and Governance, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (1999). 
 227.  Starr, supra note 71, at 124. 
 228.  Jody Freeman describes this distaste for public actors as a “visceral skepticism” and 
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This argument is particularly persuasive when thinking about 
incarceration or the military.229  Dorfman and Harel argue that there are 
some governmental duties where delegation to a private entity is 
inappropriate because to do so would affect the fundamental nature of 
the action.230  Indeed, they argue that execution by government is 
necessary to yield the “inherently public goods” associated with the 
action.231  Perhaps environmental permitting should also fall under this 
category.  The permitting program as a form of regulatory policy with 
both civil and criminal penalties may seem inappropriate in the hands of 
private entities.  If we view conservation as an important public duty, 
perhaps it is equally important that the public duty be publicly carried 
out.  This would demonstrate a public backing of land conservation as 
something important. 
Instead of an outright ban on the involvement of private actors, 
perhaps it makes more sense to limit the scope of their actions and 
increase oversight.  To begin with, we should examine the types of 
actions undertaken by public actors.  There are fewer concerns with 
contracting out ministerial duties than contracting out policy making.  
One of the challenges with mitigation is that actions that appear 
ministerial have policy-making implications.  Striving to limit private 
actions to ministerial tasks is a good step forward.  However, this is 
challenging because there is often a fine line between the two.232  For 
example, where do we classify writing the terms of a conservation 
easement?  Coming up with the terms could be policy setting as those 
terms may determine whether the conservation easements can be 
extinguished or the process for changing them.  Moreover, it is often 
even more difficult to assess which actions belong in the “private” 
category and which are “public.”233 
To alleviate some concerns with privatization or contracting out, 
others have suggested that we treat private actors more like public 
 
asserts that there is a “cultural resistance to private bodies playing a formal role in regulation.”  
Freeman, supra note 70, at 843; Starr, supra note 71, at 133.  
 229.  Many find the idea of private incarceration particularly concerning because of it involves 
private actors constraining the liberty of others. 
 230.  Dorfman & Harel, supra note 187, at 1-2. 
 231.  Id. at 3. 
 232.  See Freeman, supra note 70, at 824 (articulating the blurring that occurs between policy-
making and implementation functions). 
 233.  See Freeman, supra note 70, at 857; Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A 
Comparative Perspective, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 348 (2011) (discussing privatization of 
government services in the welfare context); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2003). 
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ones.234  For example, maybe we make the conservation easements or 
mitigation bank agreements and associated conservation easements 
subject to notice and comment processes.  Perhaps we subject private 
mitigation to Administrative Procedure Act-style review. 
Extending legal requirements of agencies over private groups doing 
public sector work could turn the private organizations into mini 
agencies.235  But this may cause them to lose the very characteristics that 
give them strength.  This added bureaucracy may not yield intended 
goals.  Additionally, efforts by the various groups may be slowed by red 
tape or some might choose not to participate.  Many participants and 
supporters of land trusts for example, turn to those groups in part 
because they did not like working with public agencies.236  Moreover, 
agencies haven’t always shown themselves to be better at getting the job 
done.  In a study of conservation easement holders in the San Francisco 
Bay Area, public agencies holding conservation easements did not 
necessarily demonstrate better stewardship and enforcement.237 
Bringing in a public voice through notice and comment and 
increasing transparency and access for private mitigators could be the 
start of improved processes.  Simply increasing public scrutiny could 
result in better enforcement and heightened stewardship.  Adding some 
level of review of private actions would go even further.  We could add 
levels of agency review rather simply by writing into the mitigation 
banking agreements and the conservation easements clear roles for 
agencies.  For example, including the permitting agencies as third-party 
beneficiaries or co-holders on conservation easements would give a clear 
route for public involvement at the agency level.  We could also see 
explicit judicial review enter into the mix.  While parties to these 
agreements can bring judicial actions regarding enforcement or to 
challenge terms, there is no clear mechanisms for agencies or members 
 
 234.  Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1507, 1555 (2001) (discussing potential implications of privatization on the Administrative 
Procedure Act and the Freedom of Information Act). 
 235.  Starr, supra note 71, at 130 (1987) (describing this shift as a “socialization of private 
provision”). 
 236.  John Carleton, Land Trusts: Indispensable Partners in Local Planning, FISH & WILDLIFE 
PLANNER (2008), available at http://wdfw.wa.gov/publications/00659/wdfw00659.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2013); Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and 
Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 
1078 (1996). 
 237.  BAY AREA OPEN SPACE COUNCIL, ENSURING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION 
EASEMENTS 14 (1999) (studying violations of conservation easements in the San Francisco Bay 
Area and finding that, although around seventy-five percent of land trusts monitored their 
conservation easements regularly, only thirty percent of public entities did so). 
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of the public to do.238  Uncertainty in state standing requirements along 
with a lack of a citizen suit provision for conservation easements 
hampers enforcement challenges by anyone other than the signatories to 
the agreement.239 
Finally, perhaps there is a third way.  We could reduce 
privatization, treat privatization more like public action, or perhaps 
explore alternative mechanisms that could offer ways to legitimate 
private regimes.  This is an area worthy of exploration.  It may be that 
external forces like market pressures, norms, and threats of public 
involvement offer possibilities for improved mitigation results.240  In the 
same way that increased transparency can cause private actors to clean 
up their act, threats of customer withdrawal or public involvement may 
be able to yield better outcomes.241  For example, as the Internal 
Revenue Service increases scrutiny on land trusts242 and state Attorneys 
General243 pay close attention to private organizations and companies, 
land trusts and mitigation bank operators may become more diligent in 
their duties. 
As understanding of environmental ills increases, so too does the 
need for a public response to those problems.  Finding ways to bring in 
nongovernmental actors could increase the level of environmental 
protection, but such moves are beset by privatization concerns.  In the 
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end, there are only two things we can ascertain for certain at this point.  
First, we need more information about the private mitigation efforts to 
understand fully what is going on over time.  Are they working well? 
Are they doing their job?  Even members of the land trust community 
question the legitimacy of the mitigation work they are doing.244  
Second, counterintuitively, improved private mitigation must be 
accompanied by public investment in the process through increased 
oversight and involvement of the private actors. 
 
 
 244.  Confidential interviews with Land Trust Staff and Attorneys. 
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